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IS EURASIA’S SECURITY ORDER AT RISK?
Dr. Stephen Blank
Strategic Studies Institute
The foundation stones of European and Eurasian security are the series of treaties
beginning with the Helsinki treaty of 1975 and its extension at Moscow in 1991; the 1987
Washington Treaty on Intermediate Nuclear forces in Europe (INF); the 1990 Paris
Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), extended in 1999; and the Paris and
Rome treaties between NATO and Russia in 1997 and 2002. However, some, if not all, of
these treaties are apparently at risk.
In 2005 Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivano, told U.S. Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld that Russia was thinking of withdrawing from the INF Treaty.
Although nothing came of this gambit, a lower-ranking Russian general restated this
interest in early, 2006, obviously at his superiors’ instigation.
Ivanov and his subordinates now also say that Russia might withdraw from the CFE
Treaty. Russia claims that the Baltic states’ failure to ratify this treaty makes the Baltic a
“gray area” from which potential threats to Russian security could come, even though
Moscow also admits that NATO’s token forces there hardly represent a current threat.
The West’s reply is that, at the Istanbul 1999 Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE) conference, it stated that the Baltic nations would ratify this treaty
when Russia withdraws its forces from Moldova and Georgia as it promised to do then.
Russia since has refused either to withdraw those forces or accept that it had any legal
or political obligation to do so. Thus a standoff has ensued.
Recently, thanks partly to Western pressure, Russia agreed with Georgia that it
would leave its bases there by 2008. Meanwhile, it refuses to leave Moldova. Indeed, it
seeks a 20-year lease on a base there to perpetuate its intervention on behalf of a
separatist and visibly criminalized Russian faction across the Dniester River. Russian
officials also talk of launching political gambits to formalize Russia's incorporation of
Georgia’s breakaway province, South Ossetia, into Russia.
These actions would not only violate Russia's 1999 agreement, putting the lie to
claims that Russia has no juridical obligation to leave Moldova and Georgia, they also
would shatter the basis of European security as outlined in the aforementioned treaties.
Incorporation of South Ossetia by force not only invokes Soviet and Tsarist precedents,
it violates the Helsinki and Moscow treaties, the Istanbul accords, and shatters the
accords with NATO. Like Moscow’s 2004 and 2006 intervention in Ukrainian elections,
such actions betray Russia's continuing inability to accept the end of empire in Eurasia
even though a Russian empire there inherently threatens Eurasian and even Russian
security.
Moreover, the efforts to withdraw from the INF and CFE treaties are connected to
Russian fears that Western military-political pressure will be used to consolidate postSoviet states’ membership in NATO and/or the European Union (EU) or to compel

democratizing reforms in Russia, or elsewhere in the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) where Moscow supports the reigning authoritarians. Since Russia cannot
compete militarily with the United States, let alone with NATO, it has discussed openly
using its strategic and/or tactical (or so called nonstrategic) nuclear weapons in a first
strike mode in the event of a threat by either of those parties against it or its interests in
the CIS. Indeed, it long ago gratuitously extended its nuclear umbrella to the CIS even
though none of those states invited it to do so. But such contingency planning truly
could only be taken to its logical culmination if Moscow frees itself from these two
treaties that are pillars of arms control and security in Europe and renounces its interest
in European security.
Ironically, Russia actually depends for its security on the restraints imposed by those
treaties upon NATO’s members, including Washington. Moreover, it depends on them
for subsidies through the Nunn-Lugar Act or Comprehensive Threat Reduction
program to gain control over its nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons arsenals.
Without that funding, it is quite likely that the recent visible regeneration of the Russian
armed forces would have been impeded greatly because at least some of those funds
would have had to go to maintain or destroy decaying nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons. Russia also needs Western, and especially American, help against terrorism
emanating from Afghanistan or Iranian and North Korean nuclearization. Therefore,
these efforts to withdraw from the relevant treaties are quite misguided, even though
Moscow’s legal right to withdraw from a treaty is obvious. But if Moscow persists in
these attempts to weaken, eviscerate, or even leave these treaties, what does that signify
concerning its goals, and what, then, is the future of European and Eurasian security?
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